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REPRESSION AND REGROUPMENT: RELIGIOUS AND NATIONALIST 
ORGANIZATIONS IN WEST SUMATRA IN  THE 1930s*
Audrey R. Kahin
Repression
In March 1937 West Sumatra's political landscape appeared calm, with no 
sign of agitation or disturbance.* 1 2 Looking back from that tranquil viewpoint 
to the turbulent events of a few years earlier, A. I. Spits, the Dutch resident 
soon to become governor of Sumatra, drew a vivid picture of the situation 
that had precipitated his government's repression of local political activity:
The whole of Sumatra's West Coast was then in a state of political 
turmoil; the ideas of independence were being propagated by young 
and old in the various organizations of the Permi, PSII, PNI, 
and PI; "Indonesia free, now or within a few years" was sung in 
all keys, not only in the larger population centers, but also 
in the countryside. The Minangkabau politicians did not limit 
their activ ities to the West Coast, but sent their propaganda 
over all Sumatra. Police measures were inadequate to contain 
this, the government lowered its guard [het gezag nam zienderoogen 
af]; there was a threatened split among the Volkshoofden; duties 
towards the government were being carried out badly, further deteri­
oration could only be checked by extraordinary means. Characteristic 
of the mentality of the Minangkabauer is the fact that by then 
the bloody lesson provided by the suppression of the disturbances 
at the beginning of 1927 seemed already to have been forgotten, 
or better perhaps, the facts had not been forgotten, that could 
not yet be, but the large majority had not drawn the correct lesson 
from them. The ideal of freedom put forward by reckless popular 
leaders still seemed to possess such a great attraction that the 
people let themselves be pushed on to a road that could lead to 
repetition of the occurrences of 1927. *
In response to these developments, in the summer of 1933 the colonial regime
* Research for this article was carried out in 1981-82 under a postdoctoral 
grant from the Committee on Southeast Asia of the Social Science Research 
Council. I would like to thank the council for their support.
1. H. Bouman, Enige Beschouw ingen over de Ontwikkeling van het Indonesisch 
Nationalisme op Sumatra's Westkust (Groningen/Jakarta: Wolters, 1938), p. 87.
2. Koloniftn Memories van Overgave [henceforth MvO] van den aftredenden Resident 
van Sumatra’ s Westkust, A. I. Spits, Mailrapport [henceforth Mr.] 504/1937, 
p. 45. (Unless otherwise stated all documents cited are in the Algemeen Rijks- 
archief [henceforth ARA], The Hague).
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had acted against the two most radical religious parties, the Permi (Persatuan 
Muslim Indonesia, Association of Indonesian Muslims) and PSII (Partai Sarekat 
Islam Indonesia, Indonesian Islamic Union Party). It forbade meetings of 
these organizations, * arrested and exiled their top leaders, and restricted 
the rights of lower-ranking members. After a transitional period, Resident 
Spits was able to conclude in 1937 that these measures had proved "completely 
effective."
By this date there had indeed been a fundamental change in the nature 
of political activity in West Sumatra. This article will examine the process 
by which the inability of the religious political parties to provide an effective 
vehicle for the nationalist movement led to the emergence of a more diffuse 
political constellation, wherein the anti-Dutch struggle was waged in a less 
openly confrontational manner. It will argue that, although the colonial 
authorities were successful in destroying the strongest nationalist religious 
party in the region, the goal of the nationalists did not change—only their 
strategy.
To understand the nature of the changes and the resulting regroupment 
of politica l forces, it  is necessary first, however, to focus on events of 
the early 1930s and the character of the threat posed by the religious/political 
parties to Dutch administration. At that time, four religious organizations 
were dominant in the region. Two of them, Permi and PSII, were strongly political 
and would become major Dutch targets. The other two were the social and educa­
tional organizations, Perti (Persatuan Tarbiah Islamiyah, Islamic Educational 
Association) and Muhammadiyah.
Muhammadiyah
Founded in Yogyakarta in 1912, the Muhammadiyah spread to many parts of 
the Indies over the subsequent decade, but did not exert much appeal in West 
Sumatra until 1925. In that year, H. Abd. Karim Amrullah (Haji Rasul)3 4 5who 
was one of the leading Minangkabau modernist ulama and a co-founder of the 
Sumatra Thawalib schools, introduced the Muhammadiyah into the region. He saw 
its philosophy and aims as consistent with those of his generation of modernist 
religious teachers, and with their determination to confine their activities to 
the religious, social, and educational spheres, eschewing involvement in political 
affairs. Shortly after he established the Muhammadiyah, however, it became a 
haven for many of the former students from whom he had become alienated in the 
early 1920s as they had turned for leadership to radical Islamic/Communist 
teachers. With the Communist uprising of January 1927 and its suppression by 
the Dutch, these young activists fled the nationalist and Communist organizations 
they had joined, and sought protection within the apolitical Muhammadiyah. 
Thus, the Muhammadiyah's West Sumatra branch grew in size and energy, spearheading 
protests and demonstrations in 1928 against the government’ s proposal to extend 
the "guru ordinance" (a restriction on private schools) to West Sumatra.*
3. See "Memorandum" signed by Resident van Heuven, "Ten Uitvoerlegging vergader- 
verbod," dated August 5, 1933, and "Toepassing vergaderverbod," dated August 24, 
1933, attached to Mr. 1249/33 (August 1933).
4. The fullest biography of Haji Rasul is Hamka [Haji Abd. Malik Karim Amrullah], 
Ajahku [My father] (Jakarta: Djajamurni, 1967).
5. The guru ordinance actually stipulated that: "Anyone wishing to give instruc­
tion on the Mohammedan religion to persons other than his immediate family
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Alarmed at these developments, Dutch authorities warned the Muhammadiyah's 
executive board on Java of the dangerous course its Minangkabau branch was 
pursuing. Efforts by the central leadership to moderate these local activities 
then caused many of the Muhammadiyah's new activist members to break away 
to form another association tied to the Thawalib schools. *
Thus, after being established in 1925 as a purely social and educational 
body patterned on the Java Muhammadiyah, the West Sumatra Muhammadiyah enjoyed 
a brief period of political activity which came to an abrupt end in 1929. 
In response to Dutch pressure, the central leadership of the association on 
Java now condemned any political actions by its members, and under A. R. Sutan 
[St.] Mansur, who was to head its Sumatra consulate from 1931 to 1944, activists 
within the Minangkabau branch were demoted and the organization "cleansed."6 7 89
Permi
Permi was a direct descendant o f ‘the student organizations of the Sumatra 
Thawalib schools, * many of whose members participated in the Communist-led 
activities of the early 1920s that culminated in the January 1927 uprisings. 
Suppression of the revolt shattered the radical student associations within 
the schools. Although scattered and subdued for a while, the young religious 
activists, as noted above, reunited in the Muhammadiyah with their moderate 
elders in opposition to the guru ordinance, and after a brief period of cooperation 
broke off to form the Sumatra Thawalib Union at the end of 1928. At its third 
conference in May 1930, the Union was transformed into the Persatuan Muslim 
Indonesia—known first as PMI and later as Permi. From its inception the 
Permi aroused Dutch suspicions, Resident Gonggrijp characterizing it as made 
up of those "religious intellectuals and small traders most receptive to Communist 
preaching."»
Over the next two years the Permi's influence expanded rapidly. Djalaluddin 
Thaib, a graduate of the Thawalib schools, was joined in its leadership by 
two dynamic returnees from Al-Azhar in Cairo, Iljas Jacoub and Muchtar Luthfi.10
should inform the regent, or patih, in Java or the district chief in the Outer 
Regions," and should get a letter of registration from the district office. 
See Taufik Abdullah, Schools and Politics: The Kaum Muda Movement in West 
Sumatra 1927-1933 (Ithacas Cornell Modern Indonesia Project, 1971), p. 112. 
On the development of the Muhammadiyah in West Sumatra, see ibid., pp. 70-97? 
Hamka, Ajahku, pp. 163-70? Deliar Noer, The Modernist Muslim Movement in Indonesia 
1900-1942 (Singapore: Oxford University Press, 1973), pp. 73-78? and MvO G. F. E. 
Gonggrijp, Mr. 360/32, pp. 3-6.
6. MvO Gonggrijp, p. 5. See also Abdullah, Schools and Politics, pp. 91-92.
7. MvO Gonggrijp, pp. 6-7. A. R. St. Mansur (b. 1895) had been educated 
in government schools and in the Sumatra Thawalib, where he was a disciple 
of H. Rasul, marrying his eldest daughter in 1917. For a biography, see Hamka, 
Ajahku, pp. 257-60.
8. The authoritative study on the West Sumatra schools and the growth of 
the Permi is Abdullah, Schools and Politics. See also Noer, Modernist Muslim 
Movement, pp. 46-56.
9. MvO Gonggrijp, p. 5.
10. For biographies of Djalaluddin Thaib, see Abdullah, Schools and Politics,
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Retrospectively, Resident van Hoeven in 1934 was to portray these three men, 
together with businessman and trader, Abdullah gelar [glr.] Basa Bandaro,11 
as the core leadership of the Permi, with other central board members acting 
principally as their spokesmen.12 By December 1932, when the party had to 
begin moves to evade growing government surveillance, it had about 160 groups 
throughout West Sumatra, with about 4,700 male, and 3,000 female members,1* 
a total which reportedly reached 10,000 in the following months. Its activities 
spread to Bengkulu, South Sumatra, Aceh, East Sumatra, and Tapanuli.14 With 
headquarters in Padang, it  was particularly active in schools, educational 
associations, affiliated youth groups, and in publishing newspapers and pamphlets. 
It was also associated with trade unions, religious organizations, and merchants' 
associations.15 16
The party was distinguished from most other nationalist organizations 
by the equal importance it accorded to the roles of Islam and nationalism 
in opposing the Dutch and by its refusal to deemphasize one in favor of the 
other. This orientation was in tune with a widely held view among West Sumatran 
Muslims that much of the dissonance in the Indonesian nationalist movement 
sprang from its leaders' reluctance to recognize Islam as the strongest unifying 
factor for their struggle. According to this view, Indonesian nationalists 
were making a basic error in taking as their model the Indian nationalist 
movement, where indeed the major line of tension ran along the Hindu-Muslim 
rift. In Indonesia, however, where 90 percent of the people were Muslims, 
to be afraid of using Islam as a basis for the nationalist movement was like 
"a tiger fearing to flee to the jungle or water fearing to flow to the sea."14 
The religious disputes between Muslims and Hindus which threatened the unity 
of the Indian nationalist movement had been transformed in Indonesia to secular/ 
religious disputes which sapped the strength of Indonesian nationalism.17
In so viewing the nationalist movement, Permi clashed not only with non­
politica l religious associations, but also with other nationalist political 
parties. Despite their differences, however, a rapprochement was reached with 
Sukarno's Partindo in the firs t half of 1932, largely through the efforts
pp. 64-65; Iljas Jacoub, see ibid., pp. 139-40 and Haluan [Padang], August
12, 1976; Muchtar Luthfi, Abdullah, Schools and Po litics , pp. 145-46; and 
Hamka, Ajahku, pp. 133, 262-63.
11. One of the most important merchants in the Pasar Gadang of Padang, Basa 
Bandaro promoted ties between Permi and the Himpunan Saudagar Indonesia, a 
trading association which provided considerable funding to the Permi. He 
became treasurer of the party, and was described by Resident Gonggrijp as 
being behind all political activity in Padang. MvO Gonggrijp, p. 9. See 
also Mardjani Martamin, Ishaq Thaher, Amir B. Mahyuddin, Sejarah Kebangkitan 
Nasional Sumatera Barat (n.p.s Proyek Penelitian dan Pencatatan Kebudayaan 
Daerah, 1977/78), pp. 77.
12. Mr. 254/35 (MvO B. H. F. van Heuven [December 31, 1934]), pp. 26-27.
13. Mr. 357/33 (January 1933), p. 17.
14. MvO van Heuven, pp. 25, 28.
15. MvO Gonggrijp.
16. Soeara Islam [Bukittinggi], November 1, 1931.
17. Ibid.
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of Basa Bandaro. The two parties agreed not to compete, and Partindo leaders, 
Muhammad Yamin and Gatot Mangkupradja attended a special Permi conference 
in July of that year at which the agreement was approved.1*
Permi spokesmen voiced their nationalist and religious aims candidly, proclaim­
ing in their speeches their opposition to colonial rule. Police agents, attending 
the party's public and private meetings, frequently halted the proceedings as 
Permi leaders, notably the party's most effective orator, Muchtar Luthfi, inflamed 
their audiences with attacks on Dutch colonialism. Equally outspoken was the 
party's outstanding woman leader, Rasuna Said, as can be seen from a report 
of her address to a public meeting of Permi in Payakumbuh in November 1932:
So long as Indonesia is still not free, Islam can not be exalted 
[hoop]; Indonesia can not be prosperous, the will of the Qur'an 
can not be fu lfilled ; the society can enjoy no peace, so long 
as Indonesia is still "colonized."
Imperialism is the enemy of the P.M.I. [Permi],
Everything that is ugly belongs to Indonesia, everything that 
is beautiful in our land, that is, the beautiful buildings and 
the asphalt roads, belong to "Hindia Belanda."
To die in damnation (the current situation) is like dying in 
wantonness, therefore you must free yourself from the bonds of 
colonialism. . . .
Though I am but a woman, I work and offer myself for the people, reli­
gion, and the fatherland; I will scorn the man who does less than I.
In our political struggle two fates are possible for us: should 
we fail we will have our later happiness in heaven; should we 
be successful, we will gain freedom.1*
It is not altogether surprising that she was arrested the next month by the 
Dutch, together with a woman colleague, Rasimah Ismail, the first two members 
of the party to be sentenced to long jail terms. *#
Although Permi continued to expand over the first half of 1933, its meetings 
became less frequent because of the increased government surveillance.*1 
In July the crushing blows began, with travel restrictions imposed on many 
of the party's leaders. On July 11, the authorities arrested Muchtar Luthfi, 
and the following month imposed the ban on assembly (vergaderverbod) on Permi 
and the PSII and their affiliated youth organizations. To circumvent these 
restrictions, the party started to send out written courses; the authorities 
confiscated them, and in early September arrested their author, Iljas Jacoub, 
and publisher, Djalaluddin Thaib. ** All three leaders were exiled to Boven 18920
18. MvO van Heuven, pp. 23-24, and Mr. 590 (February 1933), p. 15.
19. Mr. 115/33 (November 1932), pp. 9-10.
20. Rasuna Said was imprisoned for fifteen months (Mr. 227/33 [December 1932], 
pp. 10-11); Rasimah Ismail was sentenced to nine months in jail for a speech 
she had made in October (Mr. 590/33 [February 1933], p. 17).
21. Mr. 813/33 (April 1933).
22. Mr. 1187/33 (July 1933); Mr. 1249/33 (August 1933); Mr. 1367/33 (September 
1933).
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Digul at the end of 1934. With its organization decapitated, the Permi had 
to struggle to maintain skeletal communication among its members in the face 
of the continued ban on its meetings, publications, and travel, and its fear 
that government spies had infiltrated its ranks.22
PSII
The Minangkabau branch of the Sarekat Islam was never very strong during 
the organization’ s early heyday in the 1910s. In part this was because in 
West Sumatra it split into different factions, supported by traditional and 
modernist ulama.23 4 256 Also its foremost modernist adherent, Syekh Abdullah Ahmad, 
refrained from politics and concentrated on educational activities, founding 
the Adabiah school in Padang in 1908 and accepting Dutch support and advice 
in running i t .2* It was only at the end of 1928 that the PSII became active 
politically, when two penghulu (traditional village leaders) from Maninjau 
set up a section of the party there, and the fiery speeches of one of them, 
Hasanoeddin glr. Datuk [Dt.] Singo Mangkuto, brought the Dutch to arrest him 
at the end of July 1929 and sentence him to two years in jail. Largely inactive 
during his detention, the PSII revived after Dt. Singo Mangkuto's release, 
when he, together with H. Uddin Rahmany and Sabilal Rasjad glr. Dt. Bandaro, 
began to expand PSII influence beyond its Maninjau base.24 Described by the 
Dutch resident in 1932 as ”a noncooperative political organization which sees 
its goal as the full independence of ’ Indonesia’ within the shortest possible 
period, based on Islam, which as a truly democratic system must provide the 
foundation for the free ’ Indonesian’ state,"27 289PSII political goals were similar 
to those of the Permi. The local PSII leaders, however, were conscious of, 
and took pride in, the Indies-wide character and history of their party; in 
addition within West Sumatra they drew more support from the penghulu than 
did the Permi. These differences precluded any chance that the two organizations 
might merge. 22
In April 1932 the PSII held a provincial congress in Padang Panjang—the 
first congress of a political party after the 1927 uprising to espouse a platform 
of non-cooperation with the Netherlands Indies government.2* The PSII’ s head 
office on Java later disavowed various decisions of the congress, but these 
continued to govern the party’s actions not only locally but also in Tapanuli 
and the East Coast, where PSII branches had close ties with those in West
23. Mr. 2/34 (October and November 1933).
24. On the early years of the Sarekat Islam in West Sumatra, see Abdullah, 
Schools and Politics, pp. 24-31.
25. See Hamka, Ajahku, pp. 234-36.
26. MvO Gonggrijp (Mr. 360/32), pp. 13-14. It had sections in Bukittinggi, 
Guguk, Suliki, and Padang Panjang.
27. Ibid., p. 14.
28. The Dutch in fact reported PSII attacks on Luthfi’ s espousal of Islam 
and nationalism, though such a position seems to have been close to their 
own. (Mr. 590/33, February 1933, p. 9.)
29. MvO van Heuven (Mr. 254/35), p. 32. At the congress, it protested the 
agricultural laws, le tting  of lands to large industry, heerendiensten, and 
various taxes.
45
Sumatra.*0 Although the party's membership numbered only about 2,800 before 
the mid-1933 crackdown, its influence was considerable in several districts 
of the Minangkabau heartland, particularly in the rural areas, with Padang 
Panjang its only important urban stronghold.*1
The parent organization on Java denied its more radical West Sumatran 
offspring permission to set up an autonomous "West Sumatra section," although 
it did accept Dt. Singo Mangkuto as the party's local head.** The Minangkabau 
branch had an added incentive to assert its autonomy, for the PSII leadership 
on Java was adopting policies that were generally critical of the adat, while 
much of the party's rural support in West Sumatra came from traditional leaders 
in the villages.**
The government moved against the PSII and the Permi at the same time, 
viewing them as "the two most militant associations in this region." Permi 
"being purely Minangkabau, had a larger membership, yet in its fierceness 
of action the PSII held its own."*4 In August 1933, Batavia applied the ban 
on assembly to the PSII, and on September 2 Uddin Rahmany and Sabilal Rasjad 
were accused of violating the ban and arrested,** ultimately being exiled 
to Digul with the Permi leaders in December 1934.**
Perti
As with Permi and Muhammadiyah, the Perti too grew from an educational 
association, this time one of the traditionalist Kaum Tua (Old Group) who 
relied on the Shafi'i madzab and saw themselves as its defenders in the region. 
To an even greater extent than in the modernist schools and surau, ulama in 
the traditionalist schools exerted a powerful influence over their students 
and the education they received. Syekh Abbas of Padang Lawas was the leading 
figure in bringing traditional ulama together to combat the modernist ideas 
penetrating the region via the Sumatra Thawalib schools. As early as 1918, 
while s till providing traditional religious education in his school he had 
begun to introduce modern teaching methods. And in May 1928 Syekh Abbas sponsored
30. Ibid., p. 33.
31. According to this report, Dt. Singo Mangkuto tried to establish the center 
of his personal support in Padang Panjang, but was pushed aside by a "fanatical 
local leader" Marzoeki Oesman. The centers of the party's rural strength 
were in the subdistricts of Empat Angkat, Kamang, Guguk, and Maninjau. Ibid., 
pp. 34-35.
32. Mr. 227/33 (December 1932), p. 2.
33. The anti-adat stance of the PSII was made explicit later at its congress 
in Banjarnegara in June 1934, where it passed a motion against adat and adat 
law, citing in particular (possibly at the instigation of H. Agus Salim) the 
matrilineal social order in Minangkabau. Mr. 877/34 (June 1934), p. 8.
34. MvO Spits (Mr. 507/37), p. 47.
35. Hasanuddin Dt. Singo Mangkuto was visiting Java at the time and was not 
arrested. Mr. 1249/33 (August 1933), p. 6; Mr. 2/34 (October 1933), p. 6.
36. A third PSII leader, Ahmad Chatib glr. Dt. Singo Maradjo, who had been 
arrested in June 1934 for introducing political courses in PSII schools, was 
exiled to Digul along with his colleagues. See Mr. 877/34 (June 1934), pp. 9-10; 
Mr. 139/35 (December 1934), p. 6.
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a meeting with other leading traditionalists (Syekh Sulaiman ar Rasuli of 
Candung and Syekh Muhammad Djamil Djaho of Padang Panjang) to unite their 
schools in an association called the Madrasah Tarbiah Islamiyah. Two years 
later, they again met to form a social organization, Persatuan Tarbiah Islamiyah 
(PTI or Perti), which they described as "the single defensive barrier" protecting 
the Shafi'i tarekat of Sunni Islam in the region. 31 The Perti soon spread 
outside the Minangkabau. It claimed to have branches in Indragiri, Tapanuli, 
Palembang, Bengkulen, East Sumatra, and Aceh, and even in West Sumatra itself 
had reached a membership of about 4,000 by 1932. *• In its opposition to modernist 
Islamic teaching it cooperated with Minangkabau adat leaders.** Although 
the Dutch hoped that the Perti would act as a counterbalance to the more aggressive 
nationalist Muslim associations, seeing its leaders as loyal to the colonial 
government, they recognized that its conservative teachings were unlikely 
to attract a wide following among the younger generation.37 8940
* * *
It was not only Islamic organizations that were active politically in 
West Sumatra in the early 1930s. Although specifically Communist associations 
had been outlawed in the mid-1920s, there were branches of most other Jakarta-based 
nationalist parties in the region. The most influential was the Pendidikan 
Nasional Indonesia (PNI-Baru) headed at the national level by Mohammad Hatta 
and Sutan Sjahrir. Mohammad Hatta formally introduced the party into West 
Sumatra on a visit home in November 1932, shortly after his return from the 
Netherlands, and he appointed a local youth leader, Chatib Suleiman, to lead 
it. The PNI-Baru attracted support mainly from among religious nationalists, 
particularly students and teachers, in Padang Panjang, youth leaders, and 
Muhammadiyah members. Its strategy, both nationally and locally, was to emphasize 
cadre building rather than agitation, a policy which its national leaders 
believed would yield more enduring results, although a smaller following. 
PNI-Baru membership had only reached about 250 at the time the government 
clamped down on party activity in the region.41
As the Dutch administration tightened its restrictions, leaders of the 
political parties initially tried all avenues to avoid abandoning their nationalist 
activities. They substituted written courses for public meetings, reformed 
the parties' executive boards to bring more moderate leaders to the fore, 
and loosened their bonds with affiliated schools, youth organizations, and 
publications. Nevertheless, the authorities continued to harass all attempts
37. Kepartaian dan Parlementaria Indonesia (Jakarta: Kementerian Penerangan, 
1954), p. 431; Riwayat Hidup dan Perjuangan 20 Ulama Besar Sumatera Barat 
(Padang[?]t Islamic Centre Sumatera Barat, 1981), pp. 67-69; 78-80; see also 
Noer, Modernist Muslim Movement, p. 221, and Abdullah, Schools and Politics, 
pp. 135-36.
38. According to Perti's own account, it had a membership of 350,000 by the 
time of the Japanese occupation. Kepartaian, pp. 430-31.
39. The Perti flag was a sun on a black background. According to one of 
its leaders, the sun represented the Perti and the black background symbolized 
the adat. Mr. 505/40 (January 1940).
40. MvO Gonggrijp (Mr. 360/32), p. 19.
41. MvO van Heuven (Mr. 254/35), pp. 37-39.
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at politica l activity. This harassment was certainly aimed most directly 
against the Permi and PSII, but the PNI-Baru was also targeted. In Jakarta, 
Hatta and Sjahrir were arrested and exiled in late 1933. Party leaders in 
West Sumatra were not initially subject to such extreme measures, but the 
local authorities restricted the meetings of the PNI-Baru, forbade travel 
by some of its members, and greatly curtailed the party’s activities. When 
they attempted to defy these orders, several PNI-Baru leaders in West Sumatra 
too were jailed.4*
Of all the parties, however, Permi was the hardest hit. Its members le ft 
in increasing numbers as it became clear that political actions were impossible 
within it. By 1937, at the time of Resident Spits’ report, activity within 
the Permi had reached its nadir. Mohammad Sjafei, the sole remaining active 
member of its executive board, formally dissolved the party on October 18, 
1937, but by then its dissolution apparently did not even spark political 
comment in the local press.42 34
Regroupment
Anticolonial nationalists in West Sumatra, then, had tried the road of 
open revolt in 1927 and that of nonviolent political party activity in 1929-33. 
Both methods had failed, and the Dutch had effectively blocked both avenues 
of activity. This did not necessarily mean, however, that the regime was 
successful in blunting opposition to colonial rule, nor did the character 
of the nationalist movement in West Sumatra change to one of cooperation during 
these final prewar years.
Demands coming from those nationalist leaders who had not been exiled 
were certain ly moderated and their activities became more accommodating. 
This was evident in the enthusiasm with which many of them responded to the 
establishment in 1938 of a Dutch-sponsored, purely advisory semi-representative 
body, the Minangkabauraad, and the number of former activists, including Permi 
members, who attempted to gain membership in i t .44
There is also no doubt that the Dutch succeeded in crushing the Permi, 
which never again emerged as a political force in its own right. Activist 
Islamic nationalist organizations with the philosophy of the Permi never again 
wielded major political power in West Sumatra. Nevertheless, as they sought
42. In early 1935, one of the party's leaders, Mohammad Noer Arief, was exiled 
to Digul; and the following year two others, Leon Salim and Tamimi Usman, 
were jailed (the first for a year, and second for only 20 days). See Mr. 510/35 
(March 1935); Mr. 212/36 (January 1936); Mr. 967/36 (August 1936).
43. Mr. 6/38 (November 1937).
44. Among those seeking representation to the Minangkabauraad were candidates 
from noncooperative parties such as Permi, PNI-Baru, and PSII, including Mohammad 
Sjafei and Fachroeddin H.S., and Soeleman Paris glr. Dt. Maharadjo Diradjo 
from Permi; Chatib Suleiman from PNI-Baru; and Hasanuddin glr. Dt. Singo Mangkuto 
from PSII (Mr. 470/38 [April 1938]). See also Persoverzicht for August 1938 
[attached to Mr. 958] which has an article from Persamaan of August 11, where 
Darwis Thaib (a former member of the PNI-Baru and Permi) comments on Spits’ 
view that now the situation in West Sumatra has indeed changed through establish­
ment of the Minangkabauraad.
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ways to minimize the effects of their party's destruction, the Permi leaders 
did enable its youth organizations and educational institutions to survive 
by severing the party's ties with them. The Islamic nationalist ideas of 
the Permi were then kept alive in the religious schools by teachers trained 
particularly in the Islamic College in Padang and the newly opened (February 
1935) Islamic Training College in Payakumbuh, headed again by former Cairo 
graduates.45 A Malay who spent most of the 1930s as a student and teacher 
in these schools and colleges gave some indication of the atmosphere there 
and the type of education offered:
When the teachers taught history they would use Dutch books, 
but teach them in Indonesian and give them a different slant; 
for example, the first Governor-General was described as the first 
Dutch pirate who came to Indonesia. The teachers went to jail, 
perhaps for a week or two, then they came back. Someone else 
would take their place teaching school. Then they would be arrested.
If the schools were shut down, another school would open. . . .
The curriculum was the same in all the Thawalib schools, even 
the books, although there was no central committee for the schools.
Every one was organized separately, but you could recognize the 
similarities. The leaders came from the same background and all 
had the same ideas. The organizers were all political people.
Two or three or four of the top leaders really knew about Permi 
and also about modern education. They would pick cadres in the 
kampung. Would explain to them what their stand was, and the 
cadre would have this in common . . .  no overall organization 
bound them, but they understood each other and established organiza­
tions just like the others.4*
The other major haven for the Islamic nationalists was again the Muhammadiyah. 
As government persecution intensified, many Permi members fled to the apolitical 
association, and its accommodationist leadership was unable to bar their entry. 
Even after the Muhammadiyah's earlier "cleansing" several of its local leaders 
maintained their active anticolonialism, most notably S. J. St. Mangkuto who 
continued to hold high positions on the board despite his activism. The Muham­
madiyah's Java board and its Sumatra consul, A. R. St. Mansur, still frowned 
on any politicization, but "not only did [St. Mansur] acknowledge the presence 
of leftist elements in his organization, but above all [recognized] his impotence 
to retain control over them."47 In May 1936, the Dutch again reported that 
St. Mansur was aware of the dangerous influence of former Permi members on 
the Muhammadiyah, but when he investigated this danger, "he encounters difficulties 
from local leaders who will not always give information on their members."48 49
In the late 1930s up to half of the officials in some of the Muhammadiyah's 
local branches were former Permi members.48 This does not necessarily mean
45. These were Nazaruddin Thaha, H. Iljas Mohamad Ali, and H. Zainuddin (Mr. 
384/35 [February 1935]; and interview with Nazaruddin Thaha, Padang, October 
1976).
46. Interview with Kamaluddin Muhamed (Krismas), Petaling Jaya, December 21, 
1981.
47. Mr. 607/35 (April 1935), emphasis in the original.
48. Mr. 616/36 (May 1936).
49. For example, Mr. 117/39 (November 1938) in noting the large number of
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that the Muhammadiyah as an association thereby became more radical, for, 
despite Dutch suspicions, most of these new members probably viewed it mainly 
as a refuge from reprisal and did not use its willingness to harbor them as 
an opportunity to radicalize it. Nevertheless, it was never to become the 
purely social/educational association its parent was on Java.50 5123
The apparent Dutch success in defusing the "dangerous" situation in West 
Sumatra did not lead government authorities to soften their own attitudes 
towards political activity, for they now, for example, assigned the Muhammadiyah 
to the same radical place on the political spectrum previously occupied by 
the Permi. In arguing for continued vigilance, and against lifting restrictions 
on the local PSII, Resident Spits contended that the "extremist" nationalism 
of the Minangkabau still lay just below the surface, ready to reemerge as 
soon as the repressive measures were relaxed: "The earlier party spirit is 
still latent in political circles, the various occasions on which people forget 
themselves testify  to this. Political catchwords and slogans are not yet 
forgotten  and would quickly push the current expressions of loyalty aside 
[if the measures against the political parties were relaxed]."*1
In this, I think, Resident Spits was correct. Notwithstanding the lack 
of open opposition to the Dutch authorities, the mainstream of the local nation­
alist movement remained noncooperative throughout the closing years of colonial 
rule. What did change in the wake of the intensified Dutch repression of 
1933-36 was the role the political parties had previously played as the major 
vehicle for anticolonial nationalism. In their place there developed much 
more diffuse and fluid alliances, created ad hoc in response to openings offered 
by the Dutch. From 1937 on it is interesting to note how each clumsy step 
taken by the authorities, and each sensitive issue they bungled, was immediately 
seized on and shaped into a fulcrum for reviving political activity, with 
organizations that sprang up capitalizing in particular on Dutch mishandling 
of religious and/or traditional issues.
The first such step was the Dutch attempt to introduce a Marriage Registration 
Bill into West Sumatra in mid-1937. Believing that this bill conflicted with 
Islamic law, ulama from throughout the region, alongside former Permi members 
and Muhammadiyah organizations, set up protest committees.** Within a month 
traditional (Kaum Tua) and reformist (Kaum Muda) ulama cooperated to form 
a "Majlis ulama" demanding withdrawal of the bill.** Less immediate though
Permi adherents who were now executive committee members of Muhammadiyah, 
cites one district of the Maninjau region where six former Permi members who 
sat on its eleven-man executive committee included the chairman, vice chairman, 
treasurer, and commissioners.
50. This was certainly the charge of Resident Spits: "Indeed it has repeatedly 
appeared that branches of Java associations assume a completely individual 
character here. When in 1928 the Muhammadiyah took off here in a big way, 
within a brief period it changed into an extremist political association. . . . And 
even now it still repeatedly appears that the Muhammadiyah groups are under 
the influence of former Communists and similar elements." MvO Spits, Mr. 504/37, 
p. 13.
51. Ibid., p. 45.
52. Mr. 845/37 (August 1937), p. 11.
53. Mr. 921/37 (September 1937), p. 12.
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no less important was the reaction of adat groups. Two penghulu who led Muham- 
madiyah organizations in Batu Sangkar, Dt. Boengsoe and Dt. Simaradjo, formed 
a discussion committee at the end of October, and three months later were 
able to muster 360 penghulu to attend a meeting in Padang Panjang, where a 
new adat organization MTKAAM (Majelis Tinggi Kerapatan Adat Alam Minangkabau, 
High Consultative Council of the Adat of the Minangkabau World) was formally 
established. For the first time in recent history there was now a Minangkabau 
adat association that was not essentially conservative and cooperative. All 
five of its committee leaders had been members of the Muhammadiyah, with one 
of them having also belonged to the Permi.54 5678901 As the organization spread and 
developed, the Dutch viewed it with growing suspicion, seeing its membership 
as largely "made up of discontented, troublesome elements among the penghulus." ** 
Conservative penghulu officials in the Dutch administration, notably their 
long-time adviser Dt. Toemenggoeng, tried to exert a moderating influence, 
but they were rejected by the membership as a whole, ** and by June 1939 "more 
and more people of dubious reputation" were joining the MTKAAM.*’ Despite 
Dutch suspicions, however, the MTKAAM acted within the political guidelines 
laid down by the government and did not emerge as an openly nationalistic 
organization until after the Japanese invasion.
In the specifically religious field, the Dutch authorities provided their 
opposition with a potent issue when it was reported that Law 177IS, a statute 
that limited Christian missionary activity in mainly Islamic areas, might be 
repealed.** Resistance to this proposal brought together a kaleidoscope of local 
personalities representing nationalist, political, adat, and religious ideas 
from across the spectrum. The two major organizations established in August 1939 
to combat the proposed repeal (the Majlis Pertahanan Islam [Council for the 
Defense of Islam] in Padang and the Badan Permusyawaratan Islam Minangkabau 
[Minangkabau Islamic Discussion Body, BPIM] in Padang Panjang) included among 
their leaders members of Permi, PSII, Muhammadiyah, and PNI-Baru, together with 
educators and businessmen.*9 It was with this issue too that the former leader 
of the PNI-Baru, Chatib Suleiman, "moved more and more to the foreground of the 
corporate political life of this residency,"40 where he was to remain throughout 
the Japanese occupation and revolution until killed by the Dutch in 1949. In 
his pamphlet entitled, "Sikap Moeslimin Indonesia: Artikel 177 IS akan ditjaboet 
[A ttitude of Indonesian Muslims: Article 177 IS is to be repealed]" and in 
his speeches as vice chairman of the BPIM he revived the Permi theme of the 
early 1930s that Islamic and nationalist forces should combine.41
54. Mr. 187/38 (January 1938), pp. 14-17.
55. Mr. 244/39 (December 1938).
56. "C.M.T.K.A.A.M.-congres van 15-19 Maart 1939 te Fort de Koek," in Mr. 535/39 
(March 1939).
57. Mr. 885/39 (June 1939).
58. Mr. 1230/39 (August 1939).
59. Mahmoed Joenoes was chairman of the Padang committee, with Moechtar Jahja 
as vice chairman; A. R. St. Mansur was chairman of the Padang Panjang committee 
with Chatib Suleiman as vice chairman. For the full membership of the committees, 
see ibid.
60. Mr. 178/40 (November 1939), p. 2.
61. Mr. 1406/39 (September 1939).
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The son of a trader who had gone bankrupt at the end of World War I,**  
Chatib Suleiman had been educated up to the level of junior high school (MULO), 
with assistance from the Padang businessman and political activist Abdullah 
Basa Bandaro. After first earning a living playing the viola and piano in 
the movie theater in Padang, he became an active youth organizer in Padang 
Panjang and taught at the Muhammadiyah HIS and the religious Madrasah Irsyadinnas 
(MIN) run by maverick ulama Adam B.B. «* In 1932, together with Leon Salim, 
he founded and led the West Sumatra branch of the PNI-Baru, but gradually 
withdrew from active participation in the party as it became clear that Dutch 
repression was eviscerating it. He then turned his major attention to education 
and business. He established his own Merapi Institute in Padang Panjang in 
1935, and with Leon Salim published a magazine, Pemberi Sinar, focusing on 
economic affairs. In the Padang business community, he was still close to 
his benefactor, Basa Bandaro, the former treasurer of Permi, and he had close 
ties with Anwar St. Saidi, an important merchant in Bukittinggi, who founded 
the "Bank Nasional" in 1930. With Anwar and other friends, he established 
a trading association, "Bumi Putera" and the import company, "Inkorba" (Inkoops 
Organisatie Batik) in 1938.«4 His economic activities and backing from Anwar's 
National Bank gave him a financial base from which to carry on political and 
educational activities.
Assuming a role similar to the one he was to play throughout the subsequent 
decade, Chatib Suleiman now began to introduce a strategy for bringing together 
previously dissenting elements into broader, more amorphous associations, 
based on principles to which they could all agree. The cooperation of all 
religious groups in opposing the proposed repeal of 177 IS was the first of 
these, and the Indonesia Berparlemen movement became another—-one that appealed 
to an even broader spectrum of Minangkabau opinion, bringing together the 
adat and religious leaders, as well as the traditionalist and reformist ulama. * * 
As keynote speaker at the first public meeting of the Indonesia Berparlemen 
movement on December 17, 1939, Chatib Suleiman pursued an interesting line, 
as recorded by a government observer:
Chatib Soeleiman chose as his theme "Indonesia demands Parliament."
He asserted that the words "Indonesia Berparlemen" could leave
no single Indonesian still less any "foreigner" unmoved. A full- 62345
62. Apart from material in the Dutch mailrapporten, most of the information 
on Chatib Suleiman is drawn from the following sources: Rifai Abu and Abdullah 
Suhadi, Chatib Suleman [sic] (Jakarta: Departemen P & K, 1976); M. Raid Malik, 
et al., Riwayat Hidup dan Perjuangan Almarhum Chatib Suleiman (Padang Panjang: 
n.p., 1973); interviews with Leon Salim, Jakarta, October 1976.
63. Adam B.B. had studied and taught at Haji Rasul's school, but when the 
Sumatra Thawalib was established, he le ft to found his own school in Padang 
Panjang, where there could be a more direct relationship between teacher and 
pupil and greater authority lodged in the teacher than in the Thawalib schools. 
Hamka, Ajahku, pp. 124-25, 181, 264.
64. The other founders were Marzuki Yatim and Mr. Nasrun. See Abu and Suhadi, 
Chatib Suleman, p. 14; see also Mr. 378/38 (March 1938), which notes that 
Anwar was the principal promoter.
65. About 2,000 people attended the organization's public meeting on December 17, 
with representatives from such political and religious organizations as the 
PSII, Muhammadiyah, MTKAAM, and Perti.
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fledged parliament in this land would first forge a stronger tie 
between the Netherlands and Indonesia. Chatib Soeleiman then 
brought the parliamentary history of other lands into his argument.
He cited the French revolution, the driving away of the emperor, 
and the takeover of power by the people. Here, the speaker got 
his firs t warning from the Assistant Wedana. He received his 
second warning when, via the Sarekat Islam, he came to the Partai 
Kominis Indonesia as an expression of the people's desire to take 
their fate into their own hands. “
In contrast to the themes of this speech, those of the other speakers 
were entrenched deeply in local traditional and religious arguments. The 
chairman of the MTKAAM, Dt. Simarajo, claimed that the people in the Minangkabau 
could trace the parliamentary system back to their balai adat, the traditional 
meeting hall in the Minangkabau village, while H. Sirajuddin Abbas, who now 
headed the conservative religious Perti, "repeated the 38th ayat of the Qur'an 
as showing that a parliament is in line with Mohammedanism. Where 85 percent 
of Indonesians are Islamic it is only right that a full-fledged parliament 
should come to Indonesia."47
It seems that in organizing the meeting, its leaders were very conscious 
of the dangers of alarming the Dutch over renewed political or religious radicalism 
in the region. Their strategy to avoid this was revealed in the proposal 
by Anwar St. Saidi, vice chairman of the Indonesia Berparlemen committee,** 
that these two leaders, Dt. Simarajo and H. Sirajuddin Abbas, as spokesmen 
of an adat and a conservative religious party, should be the Minangkabau repre­
sentatives to the Indonesia Raya Congress in Batavia.*9
It was on December 28, 1939, only a week after this meeting that Muhammad 
Yamin, elected by the Minangkabauraad as its representative on the Volksraad, 
visited West Sumatra. This visit undoubtedly formed the basis for his opinion 
that the situation in West Sumatra "is healthy," with "Kaeoem Adat and Kaeoem 
Agama now able to cooperate with each other."6 7890
* * *
Thus by the end of the 1930s the Minangkabau nationalists appear to have 
absorbed the lessons from their earlier defeats at the hands of the Dutch 
colonial government. In so doing they had had to change many of the methods 
they used for working towards their ultimate goal of independence. Not all 
of these, however, were altered; the Muhammadiyah, for example, was still 
playing essentially the same role in the later 1930s as it had in the aftermath 
of the 1927 uprising, providing the "apolitical" haven to which religious 
activists could retreat; and parallel to it in the adat sphere there had now 
emerged a "nonpolitical" but also nonconservative adat organization, the MTKAAM,
66. Mr. 323/40 (December 1939), pp. 4-5.
67. Ibid.
68. Abdoel Rivai, a local private doctor, was its chairman. Ibid.
69. Ibid. Soeleman Paris glr. Dt. Maharadjo Diradjo, ex-Permi council member, 
member of the Minangkabauraad, and secretary of the MTKAAM executive board 
was also scheduled to attend at his own expense. (Mr. 178/40 [November 1939].)
70. Quoted in Bouman, Enige Beschouwingen, p. 88.
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which could play the same role for those penghulu who were not in accord with 
Dutch colonial rule. The principal lessons that had been learned were not 
just that the Dutch would not permit open political party opposition to their 
government, but that, in order to be effective, it was necessary for the various 
streams in Minangkabau society, that had previously worked in opposition to 
one another as well as to the Dutch, now to cooperate among themselves. This 
they were w illing to do, spurred by pragmatic leaders, particularly those 
who had some economic role in the society, such as Chatib Suleiman, Basa Bandaro, 
and Anwar St. Saidi.
In other parts of Indonesia, oppositionist and cooperative nationalists 
came together in such organizations as Parindra and Gerindo. But neither 
of these gained strength in West Sumatra. As a former Permi member wrote 
in the newspaper, Persamaam
The Parindra and Gerindo have less chance of succeeding in this 
residency, because in their Indonesianism they are indifferent 
to or opposed to Islam. The Minangkabauers always demand a religious 
foundation for their political lives . . . they must be established 
in the spirit of the Permi "Persatoean Moeslim Indonesia” incorporating 
within themselves the special qualities and insights of the above 
named party.71 72
It was this spirit that was to characterize the political life of the region 
to some extent during the Japanese occupation and more notably after 1945, 
when the local Republican leaders largely succeeded in building their opposition 
to the Dutch return on a fusion of religion and nationalism, and at the same 
time were able to operate in conjunction with the adat MTKAAM.
By 1940, then, the various streams in West Sumatran society had begun 
to converge in preparation for carrying their struggle to a further stage. 
They adopted policies not of cooperation with the Dutch but of constructive 
obstructionism and the forging of informal ties that could subsequently be 
strengthened in attaining the objective of independence. What marked the 
closing years of colonial rule off from the early 1930s was not the goal sought 
but the tactics employed. No longer was open confrontation—either physical 
or political—a viable option, so alternative methods were tried. But although 
in this period, the nationalists avoided confrontation, their militancy, as 
Resident Spits was aware, nevertheless remained latent, just below the surface 
and ready to assert itself whenever conditions were propitious.
This opportunity finally came in March 1942 at the time of the Japanese 
invasion of Indonesia. On Java the Dutch Governor-General had surrendered 
on March 9, but A. I. Spits, now Governor of Sumatra, expressed his determination 
to continue resistance there.74 Opposed to the "scorched-earth” policy proclaimed 
by the Dutch, Chatib Suleiman and his associates began organizing demonstrations 
to be held throughout West Sumatra, demanding that the Dutch transfer their 
administration to Indonesian hands, so that Indonesians could be the ones
71. Mr. 1089/38 (September 1938); quoting Persamaan, September 27, 1938, 
with article by Darwis Thaib Dt. Marah Indo.
72. The Dutch forces on Sumatra actually lost contact with the Chief of the 
General Staff on Java on the evening of March 7. For the Dutch account of 
their actions in Central Sumatra after the fa ll of Java, see Nederlands-Indi% 
contra Japan, vol. 6, De Strijd op Ambon, Timor en Sumatra (The Hague: Staats- 
drukkerij, 1959), pp. 94-110.
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to negotiate Sumatra’ s surrender with the invading forces, rather than merely 
being transferred as "articles in the inventory" from the Dutch to the Japanese. 
On March 12, the Dutch authorities in Padang Panjang arrested Chatib Suleiman, 
together with Leon Salim and four other leaders of the projected demonstrations, 
charging them with attempting to undermine the Netherlands Indies government. 
So concerned were the Dutch at their defiance that they took these prisoners 
with them when Netherlands Indies forces retreated to their final stronghold 
at Kota Cane on Aceh’ s southern borders, and the six Minangkabau nationalists 
only regained their freedom on March 29, 1942 when the Japanese stormed the 
jail where they were imprisoned.7 * 73
73. A full account of these events appears in "Tawanan Kutatjane," by Leon 
Salim (typescript, 1953) in my possession.
